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Cybersecurity leadership

A cybersecurity operating model for CEOs

Kin Levi
Portrait of Kin Levi seated in a podcast studio
Kin Levi

I would design a cybersecurity operating model around the decisions that repeatedly stall between functions. Security can identify an exposure while finance controls funding and operations controls the change window. As CEO, I would connect those powers in a recurring decision forum.

The forum

I would chair a monthly management review with the CISO, technology, finance and operations leaders, and the relevant business owners. Its agenda would contain unresolved tradeoffs, shared dependencies and commitments needing intervention. Delegated owners handle routine work; urgent incidents use an immediate response route.

Each proposal must arrive with a decision deadline, evidence, feasible alternatives and the capacity each consumes. I would require the people who can commit resources to attend or send authorized substitutes. Discussion ends with a named decision-maker and an executable instruction. Consensus cannot be a condition for acting.

The route

I would route each item through three questions. Is it within an owner’s authority and resources? Return it for execution. Does it require competing teams to change priorities? Decide it in the management forum. Does it exceed an approved risk boundary or involve a matter reserved to the board? Seek the appropriate board decision, with interim protection owned by management.

I would compare alternatives by customer harm, cost of delay, operational feasibility and remaining exposure. If evidence is missing, I want the specific check that could change the choice and the latest safe time to decide. Earlier deadlines require an earlier decision.

Oversight

NIST CSF 2.0 places strategy, roles, policy and oversight in its Govern function. I would use those outcomes to examine our arrangements; the monthly forum is my proposed implementation.

I would ask the board to approve strategic risk boundaries and scrutinize whether management operates within them. Management selects controls, assigns work and owns delivery. Directors need material departures, unresolved disagreements and evidence of follow-through. The CISO needs direct board access to challenge my account.

Hypothetical example

Suppose payroll and customer billing need the same engineers to separate privileged access. Both departments request priority. I would bring their owners together to compare the next payment obligations, exposed permissions and workable interim restrictions. The forum could reserve the first change window for payroll and restrict billing access pending its window. Finance must accept the resulting workload. If that arrangement crosses an approved boundary, I would escalate it before proceeding.

Follow-through

At the next review, I would check whether work was funded and scheduled and its safeguards held. A missed dependency reopens the allocation. I would judge this model by whether conflicts reach an authorized decision before deadlines force the outcome, and whether the board can trace that decision into action.

Kin Levi